Introduction
The South African legal system is based predominantly on a mixture of civil law (Roman-Dutch) and English Common Law 1 principles. 2 Not only South African common law principles established and applied by case law, but also legislation forms part of this mixture. 3 In academic writing Roman-Dutch, European civil law and English Common Law jurists are mainly cited as authority for South African common law principles, thus firmly establishing the South African legal system as a mixed jurisdiction. In this respect Zimmermann observed: 4 At the same time, however, English law had started to infiltrate and a process was set in motion that ultimately transformed Roman-Dutch law in South Africa into a mixed legal system with its own identity: neither purely Roman-Dutch nor purely English but an anglicized, specifically South African usus modernus of RomanDutch law.
However, a third component of the mix, namely indigenous or customary law, does not always receive the same attention. In this regard the South African Constitution of 1996 5 explicitly states that "the Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any 155 / 183 Therefore, the purpose of this paper is not to repeat a description of the nature, protection and application of customary land tenure, but to concentrate on the methodology used to interpret these rights. As the extent and application of these rights are not based on codified or statutory sources 11 but stem from customary traditions and norms, the normal rules of legal interpretation cannot be followed. This paper compares the way in which predominantly westernised courts in Canada and South Africa interpret the customary values of land use in order to determine the nature of the land tenure rights.
Main jurisprudential tendencies of legal analysis
The methodology used to interpret legal principles is based on legal analysis. In both the civil law and Common Law systems two main tendencies of theoretical thought were developed historically and jurisprudentially, namely legal positivism and natural law. 12 These two tendencies have influenced the basis of legal analysis in most western legal systems to some extent, and in this context also the application of indigenous law.
Legal positivism
The term 'positivism' has many meanings, 13 but in the sense of 'legal positivism' it is mainly used to denote the analysis of 'the law as it is', in contrast to 'the law as it ought to be' (natural law). Although the official beginning of the positivism movement is often stated as the start of the nineteenth century, 14 its roots are found in the early and medieval philosophical theories. The positivistic theories concentrated mainly on "overly strict adherence to authority, the intricate web of rules and constructions in which all intellectual activity was enmeshed and the exaggerated subtlety of the 11 The existence of customary land tenure is recognised by legislation, though; cf s 35(1) Canadian Constitution Act, 1982 , and ss 8(1), 39(3) and 211(3) South African Constitution. 12 There are also other theoretical and jurisprudential tendencies, namely historical and anthropological approaches, the economic approach, the sociological approach and modern realism. trivial distinctions drawn by the schoolmen". 15 Legal positivists were (and still are) therefore more concerned with applying legal principles rigidly as they appeared and were received from the Corpus Juris Civilis, formal precedents, legislative measures and immemorial custom, than with looking into the moral implications of laws and legal customs and the discovery of principles of universal validity. 16 The founders of English positivism, Jeremy Bentham (1748 -1832 and John Austin (1790-1859),
were characterised by their intellectual love of order, precision and the classification of the law as it is. They distinguished between formal analysis, on the one hand, and historical and functional analysis on the other hand, both being the sources of the law 'as it is'.
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The historical school or Pandectists developed positivism further by concentrating mainly on the incorporation of principles from the Corpus Juris Civilis into the German legal system. The most famous proponents of this school were Friedrich
Karl von Savigny (1779-1861) and Bernard Windscheid (1817-1892). They endeavoured to deduce a logical and watertight system of general principles from Justinian law as they interpreted it. 18 Legal positivism was received in South Africa mainly through the influence of the Pandectists, who are still regarded by many South African lawyers and legal scholars as the true proponents of the classical Roman law principles upon which the South African common law is based.
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The most important criticism against legal positivism is that it promotes formalistic and rigid legal concepts based on the strict paradigm of law as it is (or is perceived to be), without taking moral and social circumstances sufficiently into consideration. 
Natural law
The main premise of natural law is that law is based not only on the positive law created by man, but on law as it ought to be, which is dictated by a natural and higher order. This means that moral and social considerations must be taken into account in the formulation and application of legal principles. Roman-Dutch jurisprudents, who sought to develop a legal system which was based on, but not enmeshed within, the Roman tradition.
Natural law is therefore perceived as incorporating universally valid principles which are not dependant on human legislative intervention. It does not separate legal and moral issues and is a criterion against which any historical law, including Roman law, can be tested, although many Roman legal principles were also principles of natural law. Therefore, the main contributions of natural law are the emphasis on morality as part of a universal, higher legal order that has to be adhered to in a legal system, and natural reason without mere recourse to authority.
Indigenous law
The indigenous law systems of South Africa and Canada are distinctive legal systems applied for generations before any colonists settled. These systems have since survived meaningful assimilation with the principles of English Common Law Therefore lawyers firstly had to define a set of indigenous rules and then had to order them into a consistent system for use by the courts. In this process it was irrelevant how the rules were implemented in indigenous societies and whether they were morally or politically legitimate to indigenous communities. The application of positivism as a legal doctrine resulted in condemning indigenous law to the obscurity of a sub-legal order. Indigenous law was therefore often seen as a body of habits, conventions and moral standards which could be ignored by policy makers, lawyers Act, 1982. 36 Sectionss 39(3) and 211(2) Constitution, 1996: "A traditional authority that observes a system of customary law may function subject to any applicable legislation and customs, which includes amendments to, or repeal of, that legislation or those customs" and s 211(3): "The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law". 
/ 183
The trial judge of the Supreme Court of British Columbia rejected the claims of the appellants because three aspects of the evidence presented by the appellants were not regarded as sufficient proof of their land tenure rights:
(a) Although their ancestors communally possessed and used the fishing sites and adjacent lands for hunting and gathering purposes, the appellants did not prove that they had aboriginal title (ownership) over the territory in its entirety, because the judge was not persuaded that there was any system of governance or uniform custom relating to the land outside the villages. He refused to accept that the spiritual beliefs exercised within the territory were necessarily common to all of the people or universal practice.
The appellants' claim for jurisdiction over the territories (aboriginal sovereignty) 44 was rejected because of the sovereignty of the crown at common law, as well as the relative paucity of evidence regarding an established governance structure and a legal system which is 'a most uncertain and highly flexible set of customs which are frequently not followed by the Indians themselves' (para 20).
(c) The appellants' further claim for the exercise of aboriginal rights (e.g. hunting, fishing and trapping) in the disputed territories was also rejected. The judge was convinced that the aboriginal people in the disputed territories had continued to exercise these rights even after the establishment of British sovereignty, but that the aboriginal rights to land had been extinguished. Aboriginal title has been described as sui generis in order to distinguish it from 'normal' proprietary interests, such as fee simple. However, as I will now develop, it is also sui generis in the sense that its characteristics cannot be completely explained by reference either to the common law rules of real property or to the rules of property found in aboriginal legal systems. As with other aboriginal rights, it must be understood by reference to both common law and aboriginal perspectives.
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The Supreme Court clearly moved away from the positivistic approach of the two preceding courts by defining aboriginal title in accordance with indigenous land tenure principles, but subject to the underlying title of the crown.
Indigenous land tenure in South Africa
The Richtersveld saga 52 is based on a land claim which was first instituted in the that all Canadian land is subject to the underlying title of the crown is also applicable to aboriginal title. 52 The Richtersveld is a large area of land situated in the north-western region of the Northern Cape Province of South Africa bordering Namibia. It has for centuries been inhabited by the Richtersveld community. The land claim relates to a narrow strip of land on the western side parallel to the Atlantic Ocean (the subject land) which is at present owned by the first defendant, Alexkor Ltd, a public company whose sole shareholder is the Government of the Republic of South Africa and which has been mining on the subject land for diamonds since 1992. Diamonds were discovered in this area during the first half of the twentieth century. development of the common law in the same way as that in which it was developed in other countries with a colonial history. 63 The SCA held that aboriginal title is rooted in and is the creature of traditional laws and customs (para 36-43). The only requirement for the acquisition of aboriginal title is that the indigenous community must have had exclusive occupation of the land at the time when the crown acquired sovereignty. However, the SCA indicated that there are several hazards associated with the recognition of aboriginal title in South African law.
The SCA also rejected the finding of the LCC that the claimed land was terra nullius at the time of annexation because the people were insufficiently civilised (para 41).
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The SCA considered whether the Richtersveld community had a right to land at the date of annexation, and whether or not this right survived annexation by the British crown. The SCA decided on this aspect:
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During argument in this Court it was conceded on behalf of both respondents 66 that at the time of annexation the Richtersveld people had a customary law interest under their indigenous customary law entitling them to the exclusive occupation and use of the subject land and that this interest was akin to the right of ownership held under common law. 67 In my view, counsel were driven to this concession by the uncontested facts.
The legal positivistic inclination of these two courts is evident, as both courts hesitated to break with established common law (Roman-Dutch) principles. Although the SCA regarded it as unnecessary to consider the recognition of the doctrine of aboriginal title, or to consider the development of the common or customary law (as a customary law interest in land akin to common law ownership of land by the Richtersveld people was recognised), they deemed it necessary to discuss the effect of annexation on these rights. 68 It was conceded by the respondents that the Richtersveld people were sufficiently civilised to refute the notion that the 63 Section 8(3) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 states that a court may apply or develop the common law to give effect to any fundamental right protected in the Bill of Rights and s 39(2) stipulates that in the interpretation of any legislation, and when developing the common law and customary law, every court must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. S 211(3) Constitution has the same measure regarding customary law. While in the past indigenous law was seen through the common law lens, it must now be seen as an integral part of our law. Like all law it depends for its ultimate force and validity on the Constitution. Its validity must now be determined by reference not to common law, but to the Constitution. The courts are obliged by s 211(3) of the Constitution to apply customary law when it is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that deals with customary law. … It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution acknowledges the originality and distinctiveness of indigenous law as an independent source of norms within the legal system. At the same time the Constitution, while giving force to indigenous law, makes it clear that such law is subject to the Constitution and has to be interpreted in the light of its values. Furthermore, like the common law, indigenous law is subject to any legislation, consistent with the Constitution, that specifically deals with it. In the result, indigenous law feeds into, nourishes, fuses with and becomes part of the amalgam of South African law.
While the SCA's methodology to interpret the evidence was based on their endeavour to keep as close as possible to (Roman-Dutch) common law principles, the CC recognised the peculiar characteristics of indigenous law as part of the South African law, which is to be applied subject to constitutional principles and not common law principles.
The methodology used to interpret evidence
The methodology used to interpret evidence in respect of indigenous land tenure (ii) whether that title has been extinguished (onus to prove rests on the crown);
(iii) if not extinguished, whether the title has been infringed (onus to prove rests on the aboriginal group);
(iv) whether the infringement is justified (onus to prove rests on the crown).
In order to establish aboriginal title ((b)(i) above), the following must be proven by the aboriginal group:
(aa) The land must be occupied prior to sovereignty. Aboriginal Title" 13. The crown after sovereignty gained ultimate title to lands held by aboriginal people, after which the aboriginal group held a communal title at common law that formed a burden on the crown's ultimate title. See also Slattery 1987 Can Bar Rev 742; McNeil Common Law Aboriginal Title 196. the parties maintained a substantial connection with since then, is sufficiently important to be of central significance to the culture of the claimants".
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(bb) There must be continuity between present and pre-sovereignty occupation.
As conclusive evidence of pre-sovereignty occupation is often difficult to obtain, an aboriginal community may provide evidence of present occupation as proof of presovereignty occupation. In addition to this, it is required that continuity between present and pre-sovereignty occupation exists, because the relevant time for the determination of aboriginal title is at the time before sovereignty. There is no need to establish an unbroken chain of continuity, because the occupation and use of lands Although the SCA regarded it unnecessary to consider the recognition of the doctrine of aboriginal title or to consider the development of the common or customary law, as a customary law interest in land akin to common law ownership of land by the Richtersveld people was already recognised, they deemed it necessary to discuss the effect of annexation on these rights. 92 According to international law, the establishment of sovereignty over new territory could be effected by conquest or cession if the territory was inhabited, or by occupation if it was uninhabited. 93 Occupation of inhabited territory was based on the fiction that if a territory was inhabited by people regarded as insufficiently civilised, it could be acquired by occupation as if it were uninhabited and therefore terra nullius. It is clear from the uncontested evidence of the expert witnesses that the Richtersveld people had a social and political organisation, including a civil and criminal legal system based on traditional laws and customs, at the time of the annexation. It was also conceded by the respondents that the Richtersveld people were sufficiently civilised to refute the notion that the Richtersveld, including the claimed land, was terra nullius. 94 96 Therefore, the SCA found that the Richtersveld was not uninhabited and not amenable to acquisition by occupation or settlement. The indigenous inhabitants were also sufficiently civilised to refute the notion of occupation of terra nullius (para 52). Thus the territory was obtained by proclamation. The SCA compared the doctrine of recognition (which entails that annexation of the land by the British crown resulted in the abolition of all pre-existing customary rights and interests except those rights explicitly recognised by the crown) with the doctrine of continuity (that there is a presumption that a mere change in sovereignty does not extinguish the private and customary property rights of the inhabitants of the conquered territory, unless confiscated by an act of state). 97 After analysing the international precedent on this matter, the SCA accepted the doctrine of continuance and concluded that the existing customary law interest in the subject land held by the Richtersveld people survived British annexation. 98 The content of the customary law interest in land also encompasses a right to minerals and other natural resources. 99 The SCA especially relied on the evidence that the Richtersveld people had mined and used copper for the purpose of adornment long before annexation and that they appreciated the value of minerals.
They had even granted mineral leases to outsiders as early as 1856. The evidence clearly established that the Richtersveld community believed that they had the right to minerals and that they had acted in a manner consistent with such a belief. The minerals had been exploited without requesting permission from anyone to do so, and strangers and non-inhabitants respected their rights by obtaining their permission to prospect for minerals, and even concluding mineral leases with them.
Although there was no proof of mining activities by the Richtersveld community on the subject land itself, it was clear from the evidence that at the time of annexation the mining for and use of minerals was part of the distinctive culture of the Richtersveld people, 100 who appropriated for themselves the right to minerals and natural resources on the land, and that this custom had been continued from earlier days.
The CC confirmed the finding of the SCA that the Richtersveld community held a customary law interest in the subject land within the definition of 'a right in land' in the Restitution of Land Rights Act. 101 However, the CC did not agree with the description of the substantive content of the interest as "…a right to exclusive beneficial occupation and use, akin to that held under common-law ownership". 102 The nature and content of the rights of the Richtersveld community to the subject land was to be determined by reference to indigenous law, and not the common law. 
